The VMU community lacks a senior advocate who can harness the ever-growing capabilities of unmanned systems to support the future MAGTF
In late April 2010, two Marine attack squadron (VMA) AV?euro?8B Harriers under the call signs Rath 41 and 42 checked in over the Afghan city of Marjah to provide close air support (CAS) for the 7th Marine Regiment. the regimental air officer split the two aircraft between separate battalion air officers (known as forward air controllers or FACs). as the pilots received specific tasking to scan key roads throughout the city for suspicious activity, their respective FACs used video-enhanced receivers to view realtime footage from the aircrafts?euro(TM) targeting pods. Simultaneously the video was monitored inside the combat operations center (COC) of a Marine unmanned aerial vehicle squadron (VMU). the VMA, at the urging of the VMU commanding officer, would often conduct preflight mission coordination to take advantage of the high-resolution sensors on the RQ?euro?7B Shadow unmanned aircraft system (UAS) to help provide positive identification (PID) of suspicious activity.1
Fifteen minutes into the sortie, Rath 41?euro(TM)s targeting pod detected four individuals who appeared to be digging holes in one of the key roads of Marjah. With 6 months of experience flying CAS missions in southern Afghanistan, the pilots quickly identified the unusual behavior as one of the insurgent tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) for placing improvised explosive devices (IEDs). While the IED had become the insurgent?euro(TM)s favorite weapon, the likelihood of Marines witnessing the actual emplacement was extremely low. When insurgents are found emplacing IEDs, there is a very small window of time to attack the fleeting target while maintaining PID and minimizing collateral damage. Regardless of the challenges, Marines remained committed to aggressively targeting those emplacing roadside bombs as casualties from IEDs had spiked to their highest levels in the decade-long conflict in Afghanistan.
Time was of the essence as the Harriers waited for PID from the Shadow. the air officer quickly gave a nine-line attack brief to the aircraft overhead. When the Shadow placed its sensors on the suspicious location, the ?eurooeinsurgents?euro? huddled in the intersection were in fact a group of children playing in the road. the FAC immediately aborted the attack, and an uncomfortable silence on the radio followed. as the pilots waited for new tasking, they resumed their search along the same busy road.
Three hundred yards from the previous suspected target, the other Harrier on station (Rath 42), whose targeting pod was not being monitored, spotted more suspicious activity. A motorcyclist pulled off the road, left his motorcycle unattended (very unusual for the crime-ridden city), and met up with a group of men diverting traffic away from a hole they were digging in the street. Once reported, it took several minutes for the aircrew to explain the situation to the air officer, get him to switch to the new video feed, and get the Shadow back overhead to provide PID of the suspected insurgents. as the Shadow arrived overhead, its high-resolution color camera immediately identified not only the men digging but also confirmed that an IED with visible wires was being emplaced in the road. In less than 5 minutes from declaring PID from the Shadow, Rath 42 was pointing toward the earth at over 500 miles an hour, cleared to fire its 25mm cannon. Passing through 3,000 feet and just before the pilot pulled the trigger, the FAC monitoring the video feed observed an unidentified individual approaching the IED team. ?eurooeAbort! Abort! Abort!?euro? the FAC shouted into the radio, and the aircraft harmlessly screamed overhead without firing. as the fighters melted away into the city, the Harriers, low on fuel, departed, and the Shadow resumed its original tasking.
One might view the situation described as a failure since the insurgents escaped unscathed, still able to threaten our forces with IEDs. In fact, the rapid coordination between three distinct organizations (VMA, VMU, and the 7th Marines) and the ability to differentiate nefarious activity from children playing in a matter of minutes is remarkable and would not have been possible without an operationally minded VMU. Additionally, ground forces in the vicinity maintained situational awareness from a COC by closely monitoring video streams from both the Harriers and Shadow. the ground force commander was able to establish PID of suspicious activity and make a realtime collateral damage estimate in a dense urban environment without ever placing any of his Marines in harm?euro(TM)s way. In a rules of engagement restrictive environment, where avoiding civilian casualties is extremely important to the counterinsurgency strategy, the UAS, with the ability to provide PID beyond ground physically held by Marines, has become the primary enabler for aircraft weapons employment.
The current (and future) capabilities of UASs demonstrated in the above vignette have not been lost on our senior leaders. the results of the Force Structure Review Group (FSRG) (see MCG, May11, p. 12) call for a 7 percent reduction of overall active duty Marine manpower. While most manning is being reduced in conventionally oriented units, such as infantry battalions and aviation squadrons, communities well suited for the irregular conflicts (Marine Forces Special Operations Command and UASs) will see considerable expansion. By recommending an increase to the unmanned community (by 25 percent or one squadron) while decreasing nine active duty flying squadrons, the writing is ?eurooeon the wall?euro? regarding the role and importance of UASs in the future. the leaps in capability, to include flying the cargo UAS in Afghanistan this August (2011) and the conversion of the Shadow as a fires asset within the next year, demand a focused organization able to capitalize on capability and fight for the right requirements to grow the community.
Simply increasing the number of VMU squadrons will not adequately solve the challenges of the unmanned community. the only reason the Shadow was able to rapidly provide support in the event described above was because innovative leaders from the three units developed a creative synergy prior to the operation. the VMU commander, with no previous UAS experience before taking command, had extensive command and control experience F/A ?euro? in combat as an 18 weapon systems officer and FAC (airborne) and served a ground tour as an air officer. Because he saw the potential of the UAS, he aggressively advertised its operational capability. his previous combat deployments and his career of fires experience gave him a detailed understanding of combined arms in support of the ground scheme of maneuver. he even told the then-Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps, Gen James F. Amos, that his VMU, if armed, would have killed more enemy fighters than the entire Marine air combat element combined. this claim is not farfetched. the squadron flew thousands of hours where it often observed enemy fighters emplacing roadside bombs, setting ambushes, and maneuvering on Marine forces.2
Starting as early as 2016, Marine UASs will take another giant leap forward, from the planned Shadow armed with small 81mm mortar-sized ordnance to a future platform equipped with the precision guided missiles and bombs carried today by large Reaper-like (MQ?euro?9) platforms. the Group 4 category UAS will be capable of providing 10 times the on-station time and twice the range of today?euro(TM)s F/A?euro?18 Hornet while providing the speed of the MV?euro?22 Osprey and carrying as much ordnance as a combat loaded AV?euro?8B Harrier.3 this capability leap will allow the Marine Corps to change the ground rules for conducting CAS and provide the capability to remain extremely well suited for the conflicts of tomorrow.
While the VMU has seen incredible growth under the leadership of the Marine air control group (MACG (see Table 1)), its growing functions, to include weaponized Group 4 systems, within Marine aviation demand a transition to a more aviation fires-focused organization. the former Chief of Staff of the Army, GEN Eric Shinseki, once admonished his own Service by saying, ?eurooeIf you dislike change, you?euro(TM)re going to dislike irrelevance even more.?euro 4 In order to stay relevant, the Marine Corps, through the force structure review and the planned establishment of the UAS MOS in 2012, has shown a willingness to change. In order to quickly develop a competent fires-minded UAS community however, unmanned aircraft must be given equal representation to compete with other manned programs. By developing a clear vision and operating concepts beyond the motivated VMU commanding officer, in the form of a Marine unmanned group (MUG), the Marine Corps will be able to advance with the right requirements to fund an aviation program that best supports MAGTFs of the future.
The main tool to advocate for communities within the Marine Corps is through the operational advisory group (OAG). For Marine aviation, group commanders (colonels) come together once a year to discuss issues and funding priorities for the specific communities they command. at the conclusion of the OAG, the colonel advocates agree on a resulting way ahead, delineate requirements, and then take their recommendations to the general officer level for consideration.
There is no better example to understand the need for creating a new organizational structure to support the UAS community than to look at the current UAS OAG. the key platform to prioritize requirements and pave a long-term vision for a vital Marine Corps capability is not developed by colonels. Instead, the UAS OAG is held by the Headquarters Marine Corps aviation UAS requirements action officer (lieutenant colonel) with the VMU squadron commanders (with an average 1 year of experience in the community) and senior enlisted Marines separate from the control group OAG.5 this separation, with colonel commanders out of the discussion, is unthinkable for any other aviation platform or system. none of the former VMU commanders who have risen to the colonel level are directly involved in advocating for the community?euro(TM)s future through the OAG process.
The Marine Corps, not just aviation, must decide who will provide sufficient influence to properly support the vision and operating concepts of a rapidly growing capability. Marine aviation?euro(TM)s 10-year campaign plan (2011 Aviation Plan or AvPlan) presently does not adequately reflect the growing reliance that ground commanders are placing on UASs. the current vision looks a lot like the past, with 21 active duty operational strike fighter squadrons compared to three unmanned squadrons.6 as Marine UASs become lethal platforms, an adequate organizational structure in the form of a MUG is required to train and equip, develop doctrine, and harness the potential of increasingly capable systems. the MUG, commanded by a colonel with VMU command experience, will create an advocate who?eurooewill be willing to go to the mat?euro? and fight for critical requirements needed to fulfill a long-term vision.7
One option being considered to support the weaponizing of the Shadow is to return the VMU to the MAG. (See Table 2.) However, this will not solve the long-term problem of the community gaining a dedicated advocate. the synergy from being collocated with other manned platforms is a red herring as even in composite MAGs, such as MAG?euro?14, over 90 percent of the training is internal to the type/model/series (T/M/S) aircraft squadrons.8 Manned aircraft will likely remain the number one priority, and as UASs become more capable, they will threaten the very platforms (and culture) the commanders are seeking to protect. there are historical examples, like the requirement for the first automobiles to have saddles and reigns by cavalry officers, that indicate innovation and vision might be best accomplished by a whole new organization that is free of preexisting prejudices.9
The minimum threshold to create a MUG could be established by consolidating two of the current three VMUs into one command in Twentynine Palms, along with adding the new VMU outlined in the force structure review. (See Table 3.) the necessary manning required to stand up a MUG staff could be created from the manpower savings achieved by transitioning legacy F/A?euro?18D, AV?euro?8B, and EA?euro?6B squadrons to the F?euro?35. Instead of relocating VMU?euro?3 to the limited training location of Hawaii, as depicted in the 2011 AvPlan, III MEF could receive trained and ready UAS detachments from the California MUG similar to the unit deployment program construct of other T/M/S. In order to continue to provide the necessary training for II MEF, VMU?euro?2 would be transferred to the composite MAG?euro?14 at its current location at Cherry Point until additional unmanned squadrons could be established.
Locating the first MUG out of Twentynine Palms is preferred for several reasons. first, it is located in one of the best weather flying regions in the country. It is inside of restricted airspace and will not have to deal with the current Federal Aviation Administration rules prohibiting UASs from flying in national airspace. second, Twentynine Palms is home to the largest combined arms exercise in the Marine Corps, Enhanced MOJAVE VIPER, run by the Tactical Training Exercise Control Group, which dynamically integrates all platforms and units within the MAGTF. Lastly, the ranges surrounding the base, along with those under connected restricted airspace in Arizona (Marine Aviation Weapons and Tactics Squadron 1 (MAWTS?euro?1) support), will allow armed UASs to routinely train with ordnance and other aviation platforms.this plan will require the Commanding Officer, MAG?euro?14, commanding VMU?euro?2 in North Carolina, to work closely with the MUG to advocate for the community. While it is much more difficult to fly and train on the east coast, existing Marine airfields (such as Bogue and Atlantic Fields) and nearby bombing ranges should continue to support training with II MEF aviation and ground units.
The word ?eurooeunmanned?euro? does not accurately reflect the amount of manpower needed to operate unmanned aircraft. Officers and enlisted personnel must be trained with the right skills to operate these systems in order to successfully support the MAGTF of the future. although an unmanned officer MOS will begin in 2012, there will be a considerable lag from designation as a second lieutenant to the seasoned commander able to train, equip, and lead a multirole unmanned squadron for combat. With the sundown of legacy systems and the Marine Corps losing the requirement to have naval flight officers (NFOs), the UAS community could capitalize on preexisting aviation fires skill sets today while the UAS MOS matures and readies for command. the pool of aviation officers will be available to serve as commanders up to the expected first UAS lieutenant colonel command slate in 2027. NFOs, whose airframes will soon be going away, have invaluable experience and skills that could be harnessed to bring immediate credibility to weaponized UASs.
This fires mindset must also be transferred to the most experienced population within the UAS community, the senior enlisted. Having stayed with the squadrons while the officers have rotated in and out of the VMU, they deserve a significant amount of the credit for the capabilities growth within the community. One major deficiency that is currently not being adequately addressed, however, is a career roadmap for these enlisted Marines. A study conducted by the Center for Naval Analyses concluded that retention problems of highly trained enlisted UAS operators (MOS 7314) were linked to a lack of career-broadening opportunities.10 as the UAS becomes a multirole fires asset, experienced enlisted UAS operators, with the valuable understanding of aviation?euro(TM)s three-dimensional time and space relationship, should be sent on ground tours to augment the new joint terminal attack controller (JTAC) platoons being created within the artillery regiments. after this broadening ground tour, the JTAC-qualified enlisted operators will bring an invaluable perspective back to the MUG. Necessary manpower changes to the unmanned personnel ranks, which harness the experience available today and the skills needed for tomorrow, will be best, and most likely made by a dedicated colonel advocate in the form of a MUG commander.
The MUG creation and manpower roadmap must also be followed by the creation of a UAS department within MAWTS?euro?1, populated with experienced intelligence officers and assault support and fires-oriented aviators who will build a base of knowledge and be able to write sound tactical manuals and quickly advance standardized TTP. this new department, which transcends all aviation communities and functions, will be best situated to coordinate and integrate with the C?euro?3, Assault Support and Tactical Aviation Departments, standardizing the tactics of Marine aviation and integrating with the ground combat element.
Table 4 depicts a possible MUG structure that breaks up squadrons by mission set. Under the current plan, VMU squadrons will consist of two (and potentially three if cargo UASs are added) widely divergent mission-oriented airframes as early as 2016.11 although the same MOS will be working within each squadron using the same universal ground control stations and equipment, the missions are vastly different in scope and will demand tailored organizational structures. this will eventually lead to the needed breakup of the VMU into VMA(U), VMO(U) and, possibly, HML(U) squadrons. the real question for the creation of these capability-focused unmanned squadrons is not if but when.12
The capabilities being provided today by our UASs are impressive but only the beginning of the next era in Marine aviation. Once armed and able to conduct signals intelligence, electronic warfare, strike, and CAS missions, the role of the UAS will become so complex and vast it will demand its own organizational structure. this new structure, in the form of a MUG, will be best positioned to provide the long-term strategic vision of UASs for the Marine Corps. Once created, the MUG, working with a MAWTS?euro?1 UAS department, will develop operating concepts that will help define the right requirements (i.e., funding priority) to support the MAGTF in the future.
Simply increasing the number of VMU squadrons will not adequately solve the challenges of the unmanned community.
“If you don?euro(TM)t know where you are going, you will wind up somewhere else.”
1. Interviews with pilots LtCols Joseph ?eurooeUber?euro? Williams and Phillip ?eurooeJack?euro? Ash, 4 February 2011.
2. Interview with the former Commanding Officer, VMU?euro?3, LtCol James W. ?eurooeChewy?euro? Frey, 21 January 2011.
3. Key planning parameters: radius 1,350 nautical miles (nm), airspeed 240 knots (kts), 10-plus hours time on station, 2011 AvPlan. F/A?euro?18C range 2xAim?euro?9 is 1,275nm, accessed at navair.navy.mil/v22/?fuseaction=aircraft. main. VMA?euro?231 combat load 2xGBU?euro?38 (guided bomb unit), 500 joint direct attack munitions, 300 rounds 25mm. Group 4 UAS is defined by Marine Corps Family of Systems UAS Concept of Operations, p. 3.
4. Singer, P.W., Wired for War: the Robotics Revolution and Conflict in the Twenty-First Century, Penguin Press, new York, 2009, p. 282.
5. LtCol Frey interview.
6. Headquarters Marine Corps, Department of Aviation, 2011 AvPlan, Washington, DC, 2010.
7. Interview with Col mark A. ?eurooeBrain?euro? Werth, former Commanding Officer, VMU?euro?2, 31 January 2011.
8. Conservative estimate of internal squadron training and requirements-specific training obtained from multiple interviews with various T/M/S operations officers. Current MAG?euro?14 operations officer put the number closer to 1 percent, only consisting of the 2d MAW quarterly large force exercises.
10. Center for Naval Analyses study, titled ?eurooeThe Manpower Alternatives for UAS,?euro? Washington, DC, July 2009.
11. 2011 AvPlan: (1) Group 4 Marine Corps Tactical UAS: armed, 240 kts, 1,350 nm radius, 10 hours time on station; (2) Group 3 Small Tactical UAS: unarmed, 80 kts, 50 nm radius, 10 hours time on station; (3) Cargo UAS: TBD.
12. Manpower required to stand up the additional three unmanned squadrons will have to be found within Marine aviation. One option could be to consolidate all short takeoff and vertical landing (STOVL) F?euro?35B squadrons to all include 16 jets. the current Joint Strike Fighter plan calls for five carrier version, nine 10-jet STOVL squadrons, and seven 16-jet STOVL squadrons. Consolidating the number of Joint Striker Fighter squadrons from 16 to 13 provides the potential structure to split apart the VMU into community-focused VMA, VMO, and potentially HML squadrons without sacrificing capability.
